Scotus

Marbury v Madison

Marbury v. Madison, arguably the most important case in Supreme Court history, was the first U.S. Supreme Court case to apply the principle of “judicial review” — the power of federal courts to void acts of Congress in conflict with the Constitution. Written in 1803 by Chief Justice John Marshall, the decision played a key role in making the Supreme Court a separate branch of government on par with Congress and the executive.

 

The facts surrounding Marbury were complicated. In the election of 1800, the newly organized Democratic-Republican party of Thomas Jefferson defeated the Federalist party of John Adams, creating an atmosphere of political panic for the lame duck Federalists. In the final days of his presidency, Adams appointed a large number of justices of peace for the District of Columbia whose commissions were approved by the Senate, signed by the president, and affixed with the official seal of the government. The commissions were not delivered, however, and when President Jefferson assumed office March 5, 1801, he ordered James Madison, his Secretary of State, not to deliver them. William Marbury, one of the appointees, then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, or legal order, compelling Madison to show cause why he should not receive his commission.

 

In resolving the case, Chief Justice Marshall answered three questions. First, did Marbury have a right to the writ for which he petitioned? Second, did the laws of the United States allow the courts to grant Marbury such a writ? Third, if they did, could the Supreme Court issue such a writ? With regard to the first question, Marshall ruled that Marbury had been properly appointed in accordance with procedures established by law, and that he therefore had a right to the writ. Secondly, because Marbury had a legal right to his commission, the law must afford him a remedy. The Chief Justice went on to say that it was the particular responsibility of the courts to protect the rights of individuals — even against the president of the United States. At the time, Marshall’s thinly disguised lecture to President Jefferson about the rule of law was much more controversial than his statement about judicial review (which doctrine was widely accepted).

 

It was in answering the third question — whether a writ of mandamus issuing from the Supreme Court was the proper remedy — that Marshall addressed the question of judicial review. The Chief Justice ruled that the Court could not grant the writ because Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which granted it the right to do so, was unconstitutional insofar as it extended to cases of original jurisdiction. Original jurisdiction — the power to bring cases directly to the Supreme Court — was the only jurisdictional matter dealt with by the Constitution itself. According to Article III, it applied only to cases “affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls” and to cases “in which the state shall be party.” By extending the Court’s original jurisdiction to include cases like Marbury’s, Congress had exceeded it authority. And when an act of Congress is in conflict with the Constitution, it is, Marshall said, the obligation of the Court to uphold the Constitution because, by Article VI, it is the “supreme law of the land.”

 

As a result of Marshall’s decision Marbury was denied his commission — which presumably pleased President Jefferson. Jefferson was not pleased with the lecture given him by the Chief Justice, however, nor with Marshall’s affirmation of the Court’s power to review acts of Congress. For practical strategic reasons, Marshall did not say that the Court was the only interpreter of the Constitution (though he hoped it would be) and he did not say how the Court would enforce its decisions if Congress or the Executive opposed them. But, by his timely assertion of judicial review, the Court began its ascent as an equal branch of government — an equal in power to the Congress and the president. Throughout its long history, when the Court needed to affirm its legitimacy, it has cited Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison.

 

Baker v Carr

In the State legislature of Tennessee, representation was determined by a 1901 law setting the number of legislators for each county. Urban areas, which had grown greatly in population since 1901, were underrepresented. Mayor Baker of Nashville brought suit, saying that the apportionment denied voters of urban areas equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment. The federal court refused to enter the “political thicket“ of State districting, and the case was appealed to the Supreme Court.

 

In a 6-2 ruling, the Supreme Court held that federal courts have the power to determine the constitutionality of a State’s voting districts. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., wrote the majority opinion, stating that the plaintiffs’ constitutional right to have their votes count fairly gave them the necessary legal interest to bring the lawsuit. He argued that the case did not involve a “political question“ that prevented judicial review. A court could determine the constitutionality of a State’s apportionment decisions, he wrote, without interfering with the legislature’s political judgments. The case was returned to the federal court.

 

Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurring opinion. He declared that if a voter no longer has “the full constitutional value of his franchise [right to vote], and the legislative branch fails to take appropriate restorative action, the doors of the courts must be open to him.“

In a dissenting opinion, Justice John Harlan II argued that the federal equal protection clause does not prevent a State “from choosing any electoral legislative structure it thinks best suited to the interests, temper, and customs of its people.“ If a State chose to “distribute electoral strength among geographical units, rather than according to a census of population,“ he wrote, that choice “is…a rational decision of policy…entitled to equal respect from this Court.“
By holding that voters could challenge the constitutionality of electoral apportionment in federal court, Baker v. Carr opened the doors of the federal courts to a long line of apportionment cases. One year later, Douglas extended the Baker ruling by establishing the “one man, one vote“ principle in Gray v. Sanders. In 1964, Wesberry v. Sanders extended that principle to federal elections, holding that “…as nearly as practicable, one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.“

Apportionment cases have become steadily more complex. Since 1993, the Supreme Court has reviewed various State and local efforts to design legislative districts in ways that would help minority candidates. The Court has invalidated those districts if race was a “predominant factor“ in their design.

One such case is Hunt v. Cromartie, decided in 1999. In 1992, the North Carolina legislature created a district that connected several areas with many black voters. The new district was 160 miles long and in some places was no wider than the interstate highway. The Supreme Court found insufficient evidence to prove that the legislature had been racially motivated when drawing up the electoral district, and thus sent the case back to the district court for trial.